Square Peg in a Round Hole: Government Contractor Battlefield Tort Liability and the Political Question Doctrine by Jenks, Chris
Square Peg in a Round Hole: Government





As the United States military's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan enters
its seventh and ninth year respectively, there are as many or possibly more
contract employees than uniformed service members in the two combat
theatres.1 This reliance on contractors is nothing new; George Washington's
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1. Reinforcing the adage that "there are lies, damn lies, and statistics," statistics on both
contract and military personnel involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan widely vary. See
MARK TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY 186 (1907), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19987. While Twain attributes the phrase to Disraeli, the exact
origins are unclear. The Congressional Budget Office reported in August 2008 that "as of early
2008, at least 190,000 contractor personnel, including subcontractors, were working on U.S. funded
contracts in the Iraq theatre." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS' SUPPORT OF U.S.
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, 1 (2008) [hereinafter CBO]. In October 2008, the Government Accounting
Office reported that as of January 2008, the Department of Defense alone employed 200,111
contract personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-19,
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING DOD, STATE AND USAID CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTOR
PERSONNEL IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 25 (2008) [hereinafter GAO]. For discussion of the
variations in reported military personnel numbers and the different methods used to calculate troop
strength see CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL331 10, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER
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Continental Army utilized contractors. 2  Yet, while not new, the current
utilization of contractors is both quantitatively 3 and qualitatively4 different than
in previous military operations. In odd contrast to the seeming embrace of
contractors, according to a November 2009 report, the U.S. Government does
not know how many contractors it employs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 Possibly
even more striking, the U.S. Government is not tracking the number of contract
employees wounded or killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
6
This incongruous combination of necessity and apathy arguably defines, at
least in part, the relationship between the United States government and the
contractors it employs. It also serves as backdrop for a host of civil lawsuits
filed against those contractors stemming from work done at the behest of the
U.S. government. 7 These lawsuits stem from alleged wrongs committed in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, and have been filed by plaintiffs ranging from former
detainees8 suing contract interrogators and interpreters, to contract employees
9
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, 36-37 (2008) [hereinafter CRS].
2. See Stephen M. Blizzard & Marsha Kwolek, Increasing Reliance of Contractors on the
Battlefield: How Do We Keep From Crossing the Line?, A.F. J. LOGISTICS 142,144-145 (2004)
(noting that "General George Washington's Continental Army relied on civilians for transportation,
carpentry, engineering, food, and medical services").
3. In terms of the quantitative difference, the Congressional Budget Office reports that the
current ratio of contractor to military personnel in Iraq is "at least 2.5 times higher than the ratio
during any other major U.S. conflict...." CBO, supra note 1, at 1. The budget office report provides
an informative table which lists an estimated ratio of contractor to military personnel. Id. at 13
(citing William W. Epley, Civilian Support of Field Armies, 22 ARMY LOGISTICIAN 30 (1990). See
also Steven Zamparelli, Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?, 23 A.F. J.
LOGISTICS 11 (1999) [hereinafter Zamparelli]; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REPORT ON DoD PROGRAM FOR PLANNING, MANAGING, AND ACCOUNTING FOR CONTRACTOR SERvIcEs
AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL DURING CONTINGENCY OPERA TIONS 12 (2007).
4. In terms of the qualitative difference, see JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 4-0,
DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS V-1 (2008) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 4-0]
(describing DoD's increasing reliance on contractors to perform a wide range of functions and
tasks); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1-2
(2003) ("When considering contractor support, it should be understood that it is more than just
logistics; it spans the spectrum of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
functions.").
5. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 10-187 CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FURTHER
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN AGENCY TRACKING OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTS IN
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, (2009) [hereinafter GAO contractor tracking] (describing the reporting by
USAID, DoS and DoD of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as incomplete and unreliable).
6. GAO, supra note 1, at 27-28, 33, and 38. See Steven Schooner, Remember Them, Too:
Don 't Contractors Count When We Calculate The Costs of War?, WASH. POST, May 25, 2009, at
A21.
7. See generally, Cedric Ryngaert, Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military
Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1035 (2008).
8. Suits involving former detainees claiming to have been tortured by contract employees
while detained in Iraq include: Ibrahim v. Titan & CACI (Ibrahim 1), 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C.
2005); Saleh v. Titan & CACI, 436 F. Supp 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006) ; AI-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 8:08-cv-
01696-PJM (D. Md. June 30, 2008) (PACER); and Al-Shimari v. CACI, I:08-cv-00827-GBL-JFA
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suing contractors following insurgent attacks, to U.S. service members1 ° suing
contractors after vehicle and airplane crashes. The majority of the lawsuits
involve tort claims which on their face do not seem to implicate complicated
constitutional issues.1  But, in at least seventeen cases brought against military
contractors thus far, the defendants have raised just such issues by asserting the
political question doctrine as a defense.
1 2
(E.D. Va. June 30, 2008) (PACER).
9. Contractor employee suits include: Smith v. Halliburton, No. 06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (estate of a contract employee filed suit after a suicide bomber detonated a
suicide vest in a Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) operated dining facility on a U.S. military base in
Iraq); Woodson v. Halliburton, No. H-06-2107, 2006 WL 2796228 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006) (suit
filed by former KBR employee stemming from an insurgent act on a supply convoy in which
plaintiff was a driver); Fischer v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Lane v.
Halliburton, No. 06-1971, 2006 WL 2796249 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); and Smith-Idol v.
Halliburton, No. 06-1168, 2006 WL 2927685 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006) (plaintiffs or their family
members were among 18 drivers killed, missing, or injured following an April 2004 attack on a fuel
convoy in Iraq).
10. Service member suits include: MeMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir.
2007) (suit by the estates of three U.S. service members killed when the contractor-operated plane in
which they were passengers crashed during a November 2004 flight in Afghanistan); Harris v. KBR,
2:08-cv-00563 (W.D. Penn. Apr. 22, 2008) (PACER) (wrongful death suit by the survivors of a U.S.
Army Staff Sergeant electrocuted in January 2008 while showering at a facility in Iraq for which
KBR was allegedly responsible for maintaining); Baragona v. Kuwait Gulf Link Transport Co.,
No.l:05-cv-1267-WSD, 2007 WL 4125734 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2007) (wrongful death suit filed by
the survivors of a U.S. Army officer killed when his military vehicle was struck by a Kuwaiti Gulf
Link Transport Company vehicle in May 2005); Bucklin v. Halliburton, 4:07-cv-01522 (S.D. Tex.
May 7, 2007) (PACER) (wrongful death suit by the estate of Army Corporal killed in May 2005 by a
cable being used to pull a stuck KBR vehicle); Monroe v. Erinys, 4:07-cv-03528 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10,
2007) (PACER) (wrongful death suit by the father of a U.S. Army NCO killed when his vehicle was
struck by one driven by a British private security company); Carmichael v. KBR (Carmichael 1), 450
F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (guardian of U.S. Army Sergeant filed suit for injuries he
suffered while performing security duty for a KBR fuel tanker which overturned); Lessin v. KBR,
CIVA-H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (suit by U.S. Army soldier injured
by a KBR vehicle); Potts v. DynCorp Int'l, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (suit by U.S.
Army Soldier injured when a vehicle driven a contractor flipped over); Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F.
Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (suit by family of Army Soldier who fell into and drowned in the
Tigris river in Iraq in April 2004 following a traffic accident involving KBR); and Webster v.
Halliburton, 4:05-cv-03030 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005) (PACER) (wrongful death suit by the estate
of Army non-commissioned officer killed when his military vehicles was struck by a KBR vehicle in
Iraq). See also Ben Davidson, Liability on the Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought by
Soldiers Against Military Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 803 (2008).
11. Which is not to suggest that a constitutional issue is per se required for the application of
the political question doctrine. Indeed, as Professor Henkin states, "presumably, courts may, or must
abstain on a 'political question' in any kind of case, not only where constitutional issues are raised."
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 145 (2nd ed. 1996).
12. The seventeen cases are: AI-Quraishi, 8:08-cv-01696-PJM (PACER); Al-Shimari, l:08-cv-
00827-GBL-JFA (PACER); Saleh, 436 F. Supp 2d 55; Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10; Smith, 2006
WL 2521326; Fischer, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637; Lane, 2006 WL 2396249; Smith-Idol, 2006 WL
2927685; Woodson, 2006 WL 2796228; McMahon, 502 F.3d 1331; Harris, 2:08-cv-00563
(PACER); Bucklin, 4:07-cv-01522 (PACER); Carmichael I, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373; Lessin, 2006 WL
3940556; Potts, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245; Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277; and Webster, 4:05-cv-03030
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The doctrine, which traces back to Marbury v. Madison,13 "excludes from
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of
Congress or the confines of the executive branch."' 14 Despite the political
question doctrine's longevity, over time, the doctrine has been subject to various
interpretations and been inconsistently applied, yielding more confusion than
clarity. 15 There have even been periods in which commentators questioned
whether the doctrine still existed. 16
While the present use of the doctrine proves its existence, its confused
application in the contractor cases analyzed in this Article raises questions
concerning the appropriateness of applying the doctrine in battlefield-related
contractor tort litigation. The fundamental aim of the political question doctrine
is to address whether the judiciary should review government action or
decisions. And yet, private contractors are the ones asserting the defense in
cases where the government is not a named party and has yet to intervene or
submit an amicus brief. 17 Seen in this light, the confused application of the
doctrine to the contractor cases analyzed in this Article, and the correspondingly
inconsistent decisions which follow are to be expected. But, more importantly,
the application of the political question doctrine in these cases raises
fundamental questions about the appropriateness of applying the doctrine in
battlefield-related contractor tort litigation altogether--questions this Article
seeks to address.
This Article examines the use of the political question doctrine as a defense
(PACER).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
15. Justice Brennan, author of the seminal Baker v. Carr opinion, acknowledged that the
political question doctrine was comprised of "attributes which, in various settings, diverge, combine,
appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976);
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need a Political Question Doctrine?, 100
DICK. L. REv. 303 (1996). But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 142, 143-44 (2nd
ed. 1994) (questioning the existence of the political question doctrine but ultimately acknowledging
its existence while labeling it "the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines" and critiquing the
doctrine's name and the varying definitions assigned it by the Supreme Court, as well as "the
Court's failure to articulate useful criteria for deciding what subject matter presents a nonjusticiable
political question"); CHARLES WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 74-75 (4th ed. 1983)
(claiming that "[n]o branch of the law of justiciability is in such disarray as the doctrine of the
'political question,"' that "there is no workable definition of characteristics that distinguish political
questions from justiciable questions," and the doctrine is "more amenable to description by infinite
itemization than by generalization").
17. See Joanna E. Herman & Jae Hong Lee, The Political Question Doctrine: A Potential
Weapon For Military Contractors, SKYWRITINGS Spring 2008 at 18 (emphasis added); David
Kasanow & Lisa M. Norrett, Defending Battlefield Contractors in Tort Suits: A Survey of Available
Legal Theories (Jan. 24 2008) (unpublished practitioner's note, on file with author).
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in tort litigation against government contractors stemming from the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the next section, the origins and evolution of the
political question doctrine are reviewed as well as the difficulties that result
when the doctrine is applied to the military. Section three explores, through a
series of case comparisons, how those difficulties manifest themselves in the
varied analyses and outcomes in recent contractor litigation. The fourth section
considers the government's role in creating some of the confusion involved in
wartime contractor tort liability jurisprudence where it has considered the
political question doctrine and explores the ramifications of the government's
conspicuous silence concerning the same. In the final section, confusion from
the inconsistent application of the political question doctrine is assessed and a
methodology is proposed in the hopes of bringing greater clarity and consistency
to future rulings. Ultimately, the Article concludes that, absent changes in the
government's attitude toward the litigation and a more rigorous analytical
approach by the judiciary, the confusion surrounding the political question
doctrine and the inconsistency of its application will only increase.
II.
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. Origin and Evolution
The political question doctrine dates back to 1803 and Chief Justice John
Marshall's defining opinion in Marbury v. Madison, which established the
doctrine of constitutional judicial review in the United States. 18 Chief Justice
Marshall explained that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."' 19 In Marbury, Justice Marshall outlined the
delicate balance "that for every violation of a vested right, there should be a
legal remedy" but that "not all disputes are susceptible to judicial resolution." 20
Stated more plainly, Marshall explained that "[q]uestions, in their nature
political, or which are by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,
can never be made in this court." 2 1 Under this construct, some government
actions are political acts that are not examinable in a court of justice. 22 To what
extent and under what circumstances the conduct of military contractors equates
to or implicates the government action Marshall spoke of is a central issue in the
present day litigation.
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court reframed Marshall's
18. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 137.
19. Id. at 177.
20. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 47 (2006).
21. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-166.
22. Id. at 164-165 (emphasis added).
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formulation in Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., stating that "[t]he conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 23 Yet, in so doing, the Court failed
to define the parameters of government "conduct." By 1950, the Court
considered the limitations on judicial review of the executive branch deploying
the military, as raised in Johnson v. Eisentrager.24 Here, the Court provided
some insight on at least this realm of government conduct. The Court held that
"[c]ertainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation -
even by a citizen-which challenges the legality, the wisdom, the propriety of
the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular
region."
The Court signaled its willingness to reexamine what sorts of government
action were appropriate subjects of judicial review in 1961 in a case that legal
scholars consider the cornerstone of modem interpretation and application of the
political question doctrine,2 5 Baker v. Carr.26 In Baker, the Court reaffirmed
Marshall's 1806 characterization of itself as "the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution" and again assigned itself responsibility for the "delicate exercise
of constitutional interpretation." 27 The Court explained that this amounted to
"[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed."
28
To the already complex task of determining where, and to what degree, the
Constitution has committed a matter to another branch of government, the Court
outlined an additional challenge that the political doctrine question analysis
23. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
24. Eisentrager addressed whether German nationals captured and tried by military
commission in China by the U.S. Army after the end of World War II were entitled to file a writ of
habeas corpus petition in a U.S. court. While the case focused on the applicability of the writ, one
of the German national petitioners' arguments was that the presence of the U.S. military in China
was unconstitutional. 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
25. See J. Peter Mulhem, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
97, 105-06 (1988) (discussing the dominance of Baker v. Carr in judicial analysis of the political
question doctrine in federal courts); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine. 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203,
1206-13 (2001) (analyzing the "doctrinalization" of the political question doctrine through the lens
of the doctrine's lead case, Baker v. Carr); WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 450 (2nd ed.
2005) (referring to Baker v. Carr as a "landmark" case due to its influence over redistricting issues,
but also because it created the analytical framework that continues to govern political question
disputes).
26. Baker dealt with an equal protection claim stemming from a state legislative
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poses. The Court stated that "not only does resolution of [foreign relations]
issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the
exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature;
but many such questions uniquely demand a single-voiced statement of the
Government's views." 29 While the Court insisted that the judiciary retained a
role, on a pragmatic level the Court failed to define the parameters of that role.
In turning away from the idea, espoused by Oetjen30 and Eisentrager,3 1 that
judicial review of foreign policy matters was inappropriate, the Court in Baker
announced that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 32
In Baker, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[m]uch confusion results
from the capacity of the political question label to obscure the need for case-by-
case inquiry" 33 while stressing that determining whether or not the issues raised
by a case fell beyond judicial cognizance nevertheless required a discriminating
case-specific analysis. 34 In Baker, the Court attempted to define the parameters
for cases and controversies the judiciary would, and would not, examine.35 The
Court listed "several formulations," which "vary slightly according to the setting
in which the questions that arise may describe a political question, although each
has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers." 36 The Baker formulations are:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issues to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestionable adherence to a political decision already made;
or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. 37
29. Id.
30. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 297.
31. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).




36. Id. at 217.
37. Id. More recently, the Court described the six Baker "formulations" as "six independent
tests." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). Accordingly, hereinafter they are referred to as
tests. Additionally, while the Baker Court merely listed the tests, the Vieth Court, while maintaining
the same order as in Baker, numbered the tests and explained that "[t]hese tests are probably listed in
descending order of both importance and certainty." Id. at 278. This approach was arguably the
logical result of how the Court had previously considered and weighted the tests. For example, in
Powell v. McCormack, the Court conducted an extensive analysis of the first test and then
consolidated the analysis of the remaining five tests in two paragraphs. 395 U.S. 486, 548-549
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The Baker framework envisioned "a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the
political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its
nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of
judicial action." 38 Whether or not one of these tests is "inextricable" from the
case determines whether dismissal on the basis of the political question doctrine
is appropriate. The plain meaning of inextricable refers to whether the elements
of a claim can or cannot be disentangled from issues committed to or decision
making by one of the branches of government. As discussed later, each side has
inherent incentives to either avoid or implicate such issues or decision making.
It follows that this should reinforce the importance of the government weighing
in on whether a political question is involved, but the case history demonstrates
that this has not come to pass.
The Court discarded the possibility of resolving political question cases
through "semantic cataloguing," 39 yet it reached its decision in Baker by
"analyz[ing] representative cases and infer[ring] from them the analytical
threads that make up the political question doctrine." 40  However,
notwithstanding the Court's efforts to articulate a distinction, the difference
between the prohibited semantic cataloging and a permissible inference from
analytical threads is illusory. Indeed a judicial inquiry to identify representative
cases is cataloging, "semantic" or otherwise. For the Supreme Court to caution
lower courts from relying on cataloging while encouraging its functional
equivalent, styled as "analytical threads," creates a false, confusing, and
unhelpful distinction. Given this inherent contradiction in Baker, it should not
come as a surprise that, in subsequent cases, the Court found analytical threads
that do lend themselves to cataloguing, further confusing the judiciary in the
process. 4
1
Although most cases involving foreign affairs defy clean application of the
Baker tests, Baker remains the starting point for assessing the application of the
political question doctrine to the executive branch's employment of the
military.4 2 A review of the political question doctrine as applied in Gilligan v.
(1969). Notwithstanding the number and labeling of the tests as independent, discrete analysis of an
individual test seems unlikely. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (explaining
the connection between what is now referred to as the first and second Baker tests).
38. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-212.
39. Id.
40. Id. at211.
41. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(determining that interpretation of statutes involving foreign affairs is a justiciability question);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (concluding that a challenge to the President's unilateral
termination of a treaty presents a political question).
42. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) (stating that just because [the political
question] doctrine has been held inapplicable to certain carefully delineated situations, it is no reason
2010]
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Morgan, a case involving military functions, sets the stage for understanding the
increased difficulty and resulting confusion when the doctrine is applied to cases
involving military functions contracted out by the government in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
B. Gilligan v. Morgan: Political Question Doctrine Applied to Military
Functions
There is little in the way of a discernible pattern to how courts at all levels
interpret and apply the Baker tests. The Supreme Court case Gilligan v. Morgan
illustrates the difficulties that political question cases dealing with the military
present. Gilligan stemmed from an incident at Kent State University where
members of the Ohio National Guard wounded and killed several students in
1970. 43 The Court in Gilligan reviewed a challenge to military readiness
decisions made by the Ohio National Guard. 44
Initially, the district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court to answer the
question of whether there was a pattern of training, weaponry and/or orders
within the Ohio National Guard which made the use of lethal force at Kent State
inevitable. 45 The Supreme Court, in turn, addressed the appropriateness of
judicial involvement with the issues underlying both this question and the
request for injunctive relief which sought to limit the Governor's use of the
National Guard. 46  The Supreme Court cited with approval to Judge
Calebrezzi's dissent from the Sixth Circuit's ruling. 47 In his dissent, Judge
Calebrezzi explained how the Baker tests precluded judicial regulation of
National Guard training and equipment:
I believe that the congressional and executive authority to prescribe and regulate
the training and weaponry of the National Guard, as set forth above, clearly
precludes any form ofjudicial regulation of the same matters. I can envision no
form of judicial relief which, if directed at the training and weaponry of the
National Guard, would not involve a serious conflict with a "'coordinate political
department; . . . a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [the question]; ... the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; ... the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
for federal courts to assume its demise"); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-27 (1986)
(reviewing the Baker formulations and reaffirming the Court's commitment to Baker while
"declining Justice O'Connor's implicit invitation to rethink [the Baker] approach").
43. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 28:1
SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE
respect due coordinate branches of government; .. . an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [and] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.' ..." Any such relief, whether it prescribed
standards of training and weaponry or simply ordered compliance with the
standards set by Congress and/or the Executive, would necessarily draw the
courts into a nonjusticiable political question, over which we have no
jurisdiction.4s
Based on this reasoning, one possible interpretation of Gilligan is that it
provides guidance on the parameters and limitations of judicial review of the
military.4 9 Yet another interpretation of Gilligan, suggested by the Court in a
later case, makes determinant whether the plaintiffs were requesting injunctive
relief from ongoing or future conduct or damages for injury arising from past
conduct. Where the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, including in Gilligan, the
Court heard the case and applied the political question doctrine, reversing the
Sixth Circuit for not dismissing Gilligan.50 In contrast, a year later, the
Supreme Court again reversed the Sixth Circuit, this time in Scheuer, for
dismissing a damages suit against the governor of Ohio and the head of the Ohio
National Guard arising out of the Kent State shootings. 5 1 In Gilligan, the court
noted that
[T]his is not a case in which damages are sought for injuries sustained during the
tragic occurrence at Kent State. Nor is it an action seeking a restraining order
against some specified and imminently threatened unlawful action. Rather, it is a
broad call on judicial power to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the
activities of the Ohio National Guard. This far-reaching demand for relief
presents important questions of justiciability. 52
One means of reconciling these decisions is to assert that the Court was
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. In the Court's words,
"[i]t would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly
responsible-as the Judicial Branch is not-to the electoral process. Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in
branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.
It is this power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives
and officials which underlies our entire constitutional system; the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals failed to give appropriate weight to this separation of powers."
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 5.
51. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982), but on other grounds.
52. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
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more inclined to invoke the political question doctrine in Gilligan because
injunctive relief against the military would require greater judicial intrusion into
essential military functions. Yet, even where the requested relief is limited to
monetary damages, as in Scheuer, the district court would seem to be on almost
equally unsteady footing in hearing a case to recover damages for injuries
suffered stemming from scenarios implicating the military. In either case, the
judiciary would deprive the executive and legislative branches of the "ultimate
authority" in areas textually committed to those branches by the Constitution.
A court focusing on the distinction between injunctive and monetary relief
established in Gilligan and Scheuer would seem to be following the edict in
Baker "to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the analytical
threads" as a way to determine the applicability of the political question
doctrine. 53 However, this arguably false, or at least superficial, dichotomy
between forms of relief only serves to mask the difficulties courts face in trying
to identify real analytical threads from cases involving military functions.
These difficulties are readily apparent in recent litigation involving U.S.
government contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Understandably,
courts seem to struggle with the applicability of the political question doctrine to
the expanding role of contractors in battlefield or quasi-battlefield environments.
Specifically, courts vary in their ability to reduce the cases down to the specific
military decision, or decisions the defendant contractor claims warrant the
application of the political question doctrine and whether those military
decisions implicate at least a cause, if not the proximate cause, of the plaintiffs
tort case. Before discussing a proposed methodology which may bring some
clarity and consistency to future cases, the disparate results currently witnessed
in the courts and stemming from variations in the level and type of judicial
analysis warrant discussion, as does the government's role in muddying the
doctrinal waters.
III.
CURRENT CONTRACTOR LITIGATION INVOLVING POLITICAL QUESTION
A. Contract Interrogators vs. Contractor Interpreters 
54
1. Saleh and Ibrahim
Variations in the level and type of judicial analysis exist in two related and
eventually consolidated cases, Saleh and Ibrahim. These cases typify suits filed
by former Iraqi detainees against contract interrogators and interpreters who, in
53. Baker, 369 U.S. at211 (1962).
54. In addition to the two cases chosen as examples, the reader may also wish to consider Al-
Shimari v. CACI, No. No. 08-0827, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29995, (E.D.Va. Mar. 18, 2009) and Al-
Quraishi v. Nakhla, 8:08-cv-01696-PJM (D. Md. June 30, 2008) (PACER).
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their defense, have turned to the political question doctrine. 55 In both cases, the
plaintiffs allege that CACI, a government contractor that provided interrogators,
and Titan, a government contractor that provided interpreters, unlawfully
tortured the plaintiffs while they were detained in Iraq.56 The real significance
of the cases is not the political question doctrine analysis the courts conducted
but that which they failed to do5 7 in not considering the relationship of
interrogation as a uniquely governmental function to the textual commitment
prong of the Baker tests.
The two cases are also emblematic of the enhanced difficulty in applying
the political question doctrine to contractors providing wartime related services.
Notably, the courts are often called upon to evaluate the federal government's
interests, here the military intelligence derived from battlefield interrogations
and possible conflicts with those interests, despite receiving minimal input from
the government itself. Indeed, minimal input overstates the U.S. Government's
role in the interrogator and contractor litigation thus far. As is discussed more
fully in Section IV of this Article, although these cases are directly related to the
U.S. military's ability to function in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Government
has yet to file a single amicus brief in them.
Ultimately, different levels of the court system dismissed the Saleh and
Ibrahim suits.58 The analysis used by the district court in dismissing the suit
against the contract interpreters but not the contract interrogators is striking.
The court determined that "treatment of prisoners during wartime undoubtedly
implicates uniquely federal interests." 59 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
suit against the interpreters but not the interrogators even though the nexus to
treatment of prisoners is obviously much stronger as concerns the latter.
In terms of the Baker analysis, interpreting may not be a function that
immediately suggests an issue committed to the executive branch. However, the
55. See Saleh v. Titan & CACI, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006); and Ibrahim v. Titan &
CACI (Ibrahim 1), 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
56. See Saleh, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55; Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10.
57. Nor does the record supply any evidence that the contractor interrogator defendants raised
the issue.
58. The district court dismissed the claims against the contract interpreters, finding that the
combat activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act preempted the plaintiff's state tort claims.
Ibrahim v. Titan, 556 F. Supp. 2d I (D. D.C. 2007). The district court held that the contract
interpreters, unlike the contract interrogators, were under the exclusive control of the government.
That the government was more closely supervising contract interpreters as opposed to the
interrogators seems itself problematic. Interrogators by definition are in closer, indeed physical
contact with detainees, and as discussed infra, interrogation is in an inherently governmental
function. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the claims against the interpreters but reversed the district court on the interrogators,
dismissing the claims against them as well. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2009).
59. The word "treatment" would seem to apply more to the CACI interrogators than the Titan
interpreters. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d. at 18.
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litigation thus far has overlooked the fact that interrogation of suspected wartime
enemies is an inherently governmental function which is committed to the
executive branch and yet contracted out to a non-governmental entity.
2. Interrogation as an Inherently Governmental Function
In the lawsuits by former detainees against contract interrogators, no
mention appears to have been made that the government's use of contract
interrogators violates the determination the Army made in 2000 that "the
gathering and analysis" of tactical intelligence is considered "an inherently
governmental function barred from private sector performance." 60 In 2003, the
White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reinforced the
Army's determination by including in its reissued federal policy for competition
for commercial activities the requirement that all governmental agencies shall
"perform inherently governmental activities with government personnel."'6 1
In 2004, the U.S. Army acknowledged both its use of contract interrogators
in Iraq and that this use violated the Army's 2000 policy determination. 62 The
DoD has since issued instructions that detail under what circumstances contract
interrogators may be used.63 Eventually, Congress also took a position on this
60. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for the Army for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs to the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army for Intelligence (Dec. 26, 2000), available at
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/25-dIntelligence.pdf (stating that "[a]t the tactical
level, the intelligence function under the operational control of the Army performed by military in
the operating forces is an inherently Governmental function barred from private sector
performance." and "gathering and analysis of [tactical] intelligence.. requires the exercise of
substantial discretion in applying Government authority because intelligence at the tactical level is
integral to the application of combat power by the sovereign authority."). The policy outlined in the
memo did not just prohibit contract interrogators at the tactical level, but also "at the operational and
strategic level, the intelligence function (less support) performed by military personnel and Federal
civilian employees is a non-inherently government function that should exempted from private
sector performance on the basis of risk to national security from relying on contractors to perform
this function." Id.
61. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, CIRCULAR NO. A-
76 (Revised) (May 29, 2003). See Joel Brinkley, The Reach of War: Intelligence Collection; Army
Policy Bars Interrogations by Private Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EODE3D81230F93 1A25755COA9629C8B63&sec
=&spon=&pagewanted all.
62. Brinkley, supra note 61. While not revoking the 2000 policy determination, Army
officials in Iraq claimed that they "retain the right to make exceptions" and that "in light of 9/11
and the war on terror, the world is a different place than it was when that was written in 2000." Id.
See also, David Isenberg, Dogs of War: Inherently Governmental?, UPI.COM, May 9, 2008,
http://www.njscvva.org/Armed%20Forces%2ONews%20PDFs/200805/2008%2005 %2009%20-
%20Dogs%20of%20War.pdf.
63. U.S. DEPT'T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 1100.22, GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING WORKFORCE
MIX (7 Sep. 2006) [hereinafter DODI]. The DODI provides that if interrogations are to be
"performed in hostile areas where security necessary for DoD civilian performance cannot be
provided" then the interrogation position is considered a function which "cannot be legally
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question in an interim version of 2009 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) which banned the use of contract interrogators in combat zones.64 This
led to the Executive Office of the President issuing a statement that
[T]he Administration strongly objects to requirements that would prevent the
Department of Defense from conducting lawful interrogations in the most
effective manner by restricting the process solely to government personnel; in
some cases, a contract interrogator may possess the best combination of skills to
obtain the needed information. Such a provision would unduly limit the United
States' ability to obtain intelligence needed to protect Americans from attack. 65
Congress subsequently agreed to an amendment to the NDAA that changed
the prohibition against the use of contract interrogators to a non-binding "sense
of Congress." 66 By the summer of 2009, the DoD had issued an interim final
contracted and shall be designated for performance by government personnel." DODI at 1 6.1.2 and
Enclosure 2 E 2.1.6.2. But "in areas where adequate security is available and is expected to
continue, properly trained and cleared contractors may be used to draft interrogation plans for
government approval and conduct government approved interrogations." Enclosure 2, 2.1.6.2. The
DODI claims that "[r]esponsibility for [detainee] handling as well as decisions concerning how they
are treated cannot be transferred to private sector contractors who are beyond the reach of
government controls." Id. at 2.1.6. Given that the government has criminal jurisdiction over
contractors both through the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (18 U.S.C. § 3261) and more
recently, the Uniform Code of Justice (10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10)), it does not seem that contractors are
beyond the reach of government controls. Although presumably not the intent, given that such
controls exist, the DODI would seem to allow private sector contractors to be responsible for
detainee handling and treatment. Where the DODI at least attempts to restrict the use of contract
interrogators due to battlefield interrogation's inherently government function status, the DODI
states that "properly trained and cleared contractors may be used as linguists, interpreters, report
writers, etc...."/d. at 2.1.6.2.
64. S. 3001, 110th Cong. § 1036 (2008) (as reported by the S. Comm. On Armed Services,
May 12, 2008); H.R. 5658 § 1077, 110th Cong. The bill required that, by one year after the
enactment of the FY 2009 NDAA:
The DOD manpower mix criteria [discussed in the DODI, supra note 62, at 6. 1 ] and
the [Federal Acquisition Regulation] be revised to provide that: (1) the interrogation
of prisoners of war and other detainees is an inherently governmental function that
cannot be transferred to private contractors who are beyond the reach of controls
applicable to government personnel; and (2) properly trained and cleared contractors
may be used as linguists, interpreters, report writers, and information technology
technicians if their work is properly reviewed by appropriate government personnel.
65. Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy S.3001-National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 (Sep. 9, 2008), http://www.fas.org/
irp/news/2008/09/wh090908.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
66. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, PUB. L. No. 100-417 § 1057
(2008). The sense of Congress is titled "Interrogation of Detainees by Contractor Personnel" and
states that:
It is the sense of Congress that- (1) the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war,
civilian internees, retained persons, other detainees, terrorists, and criminals when
captured, transferred, confined, or detained during or in the aftermath of hostilities is
an inherently governmental function and cannot appropriately be transferred to private
sector contractors; (2) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense should develop the resources needed to ensure that
interrogations described in paragraph (1) can be conducted by government personnel
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rule that purported to "procedurally close existing gaps in the oversight of
Private Security Contractors, ensur[ing] compliance with laws and regulations
pertaining to Inherently Governmental functions ..."67 However, this rule is
limited to contractors performing private security functions, which the rule
defines as engaging in guarding of "personnel, facilities, designated sites, or
property" and "any other activity for which personnel are required to carry
weapons for the performance of their duties." 6 8  The DoD's efforts did not
appear to satisfy Congress, which renewed its efforts to bar the use of
contractors in interrogating detainees, this time through language in the 2010
NDAA. 69 This, in turn, prompted similar opposition from the White House,
despite the change in Presidential administrations which occurred between the
2009 and 2010 NDAA versions.70
The Army's determination that interrogation is an inherently governmental
function, at a minimum for the time period at issue in the litigation, would seem
to aid the contract interrogators' political question doctrine argument. In fact,
the Army's determination coupled with the White House's OMB policy should
have been considered under Baker as "textual commitment" of interrogation to
the executive branch. That the Army violated its own determination and thereby
triggered Congressional involvement only strengthens the argument for the
doctrine's applicability. Specifically, the contract interrogators would appear to
be able to argue that for the judiciary to speak on an issue which both the
executive and legislative branches have spoken would constitute the "lack of
respect due coordinate branches of government," which Baker cautioned courts
to avoid.71  Additionally, for the courts to address the use of contract
interrogators when the executive branch has said one thing (while doing
and not by private sector contractors; and (3) properly trained and cleared contractors
may appropriately be used as linguists, interpreters, report writers, information
technology technicians, and other employees filling ancillary positions, if the private
sector contractors are subject to the same rules, procedures, policies, and laws
pertaining to detainee operations and interrogations that govern the execution of these
positions by government personnel.
67. Summary, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, 74
FED. REG. 136 (July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 159).
68. Id.at§159.3.
69. Karen DeYoung, Administration Bridles at Bar on Contractors, WASH. POST., July 16,
2009, at A2 (referring to a provision in the 2010 defense funding bill which would list interrogation
as an inherently governmental function and quoting one of provisions supporters, Senator Carl
Levin, as saying that interrogations "cannot be transferred to contractor personnel.").
70. Id. (quoting the White House as expressing "serious concerns" about Congress' attempt to
bar the use of contract interrogators which, according to one administration official "could prevent
U.S. Forces from conducting lawful interrogations in the most effective manner). Interestingly, the
provision provides an exception for the use of contract interpreters which prompted an
administration official to state than any distinction between contract interpreters and contract
interrogators is "artificial." Id.
71. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (1962).
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another) and Congress has also spoken would embody the "multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question," which Baker
forbids. 7
2
B. Insurgent Attacks Compared to Vehicle and Aircraft Crashes
The strained application of the political question doctrine to wartime
contractor activities is perhaps most glaring when cases involving insurgent
attacks against contractors are compared to cases involving contractor vehicle
and aircraft crashes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similar to the
interpreter/interrogator cases, the comparative outcomes in the insurgent attack
and vehicle/aircraft crash cases often appear counterintuitive and inconsistent.
1. Insurgent Attacks
The Fisher, Lane, and Smith-Idol line of federal cases from Texas provide
contrasting views regarding the application of the political question doctrine to
contractor employee suits stemming from insurgent attacks.7 3 The plaintiffs in
each of these cases were former truck drivers (or their representatives) who
worked for Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) in Iraq and were injured or killed
when insurgents attacked their logistics convoys in April, 2004.14  KBR
operated the convoys pursuant to a contract with the Army to provide essential
services and personnel to support its military operations in Iraq.
75
The plaintiffs in each suit claimed that during KBR's efforts to hire drivers,
it committed fraud and deceit by intentionally misrepresenting the dangers in
Iraq.76 The plaintiffs also alleged that KBR had control over when, where, and
how to deploy the logistics convoys, and the negligent manner in which it did so
led to their physical injuries and/or death. 77
72. Id.
73. At the district court level, see Fischer v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Tex.
2005); Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971, 2006 WL 2396249 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); and
Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 WL 2927685 (S.D. Tex. Oct. II, 2006). At the
appellate level, see Lane v. Halliburton (Lane Appeal), 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008), the
consolidated appeal. Although not part of the Fisher, Lane, and Smith-Idol series, Woodson involved
"significantly similar" facts, arguments, and evidence, the difference essentially being that the
plaintiff was injured by an insurgent attack of a Halliburton logistics convoy on a different date and
at a different location in Iraq. Woodson v. Halliburton, No. H-06-2107 2006 WL 2796228 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 28, 2006) (accordingly, the district court dismissed Woodson on the same political
question grounds as in Fisher, Lane, and Smith Idol).
74. Fischer v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Lane v. Halliburton, No.06-
1971, 2006 WL 2396249 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. 06-1168, 2006
WL 2927685 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006).
75. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
76. Id. at 639; Lane, 2006 WL 2396249, at * 1; Smith-Idol, 2006 WL 2927685, at * I.
77. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
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The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims on, among other
grounds, the political question doctrine. KBR argued that the Army, not KBR,
controlled the deployment and protection of logistics convoys and that those
decisions that KBR did make in this regard were "so interwoven with Army
decisions, the court lacks jurisdiction.. .under the political question doctrine." 78
The plaintiffs replied that the political question doctrine did not apply because
their complaint "involves claims by civilians, not military personnel, questions
[KBR's] actions as civilian contractors, not the Army's execution of a mission..
" and alleged that [KBR], not the Army, directed the convoys in question,
"making inquiry into military decisions and rules of engagement
unnecessary."
79
The district court dismissed all three cases on political question grounds,
finding that the nature of the suit implicated three of the Baker tests. 80 The
court stated that Baker requires a determination of "whether a political question
will arise during the course of the trial, not whether it is evident from the face of
78. Id. Specifically, KBR argued that:
The Complaint necessarily raises issues regarding the conduct of military operations
during armed conflict that are committed to the discretion of the political branches of
government. Further, no judicially manageable standards exist to evaluate the
propriety of the issues here, including: whether the military adequately considered
security concerns and supply needs when it planned, scheduled, and deployed the fuel
supply convoy; whether it assigned force protection sufficient to deal with potential
threats along the convoy route it selected; whether it properly evaluated the level of
threats present on that route; and whether it properly trained, prepared, and equipped
the military personnel providing force protection to the convoy.
Motion to Dismiss at 36, Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); Motion to
Dismiss at 29-30, Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 11,2006). The motion to
dismiss in Fisher was sealed.
79. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 641. The plaintiffs argued that the very language of the
LOGCAP contract required KBR to "manage and direct their own convoys." Id. at 642. As well,
they quoted from an Army publication entitled "Contractors on the Battlefield" to support the
proposition that military "[c]ommanders do not have direct control over contractors or their
employees (employees are not the same as government employees); only contractors manage,
supervise, and give directions to their employees." Id.
80. Id. at 639-44. Under the first Baker test, textual constitutional commitment to a coordinate
branch, the court held that "it cannot try a case set on a battlefield during war-time without an
impermissible intrusion into powers expressly granted to the Executive by the Constitution." Id. at
641. The court also found the second Baker test, lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards "equally implicated." Id. While the plaintiffs contended that their focus was on KBR's
actions and not those of the Army, the court held it would "inexorably be drawn" to distinguish and
examine decisions by both KBR and the Army, a task for which the judiciary lacks "discoverable
and meaningful standards." Id. at 644. Applying the third test, nonjudicial policy determination and
lack of respect, the court contended that plaintiffs ask it to determine why the convoy attack
happened. Id. at 641-44. To answer this question would require, in the judges' estimation, delving
into the wisdom of using contractors on the battlefield at all as well as using them on the specific
convoys at issue. Id. at 644. The court labeled attempts to resolve the issue as tantamount to
examining the policies of the Executive Branch during wartime, "a step the court declines to take."
Id.
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the complaint." 8 1 It claimed that "[e]ven if KBR had authority to deploy or
recall convoys, the court would still need to determine whether the Army could
or should have countermanded that order."82 In the end, the court concluded
that it would have to substitute its judgment for that of the Army to be able to
hear the case.
83
In response to the lower court's ruling, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth
Circuit and attempted to frame the issue as a damages claim by civilian truck
drivers employed by a private contractor that was "providing non-combat
logistical support services in Iraq." 84 They claimed that "the conflict in Iraq
happens to be a politically charged matter, but that does not make this case
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine." 85 Furthermore, the
appellants contended that the district court "simply saw Iraq and stopped."
86
In contrast, KBR asked the appellate court "[w]hether [a]ppellants'
damages suits, if adjudicated, would require the district court to second-guess
U.S. military policies and decisions that resulted in the convoy incidents
involved in these appeals and relate to the conduct of the ongoing war in Iraq,
and thus are barred by the political question doctrine." 87 They argued that "the
Baker [tests] demonstrate that adjudication of appellant's claims would require
resolution of non-justiciable political questions." 88  Political questions were,
KBR alleged, inherent in both the fraud and tort claims and "could not be
avoided." 89  Moreover, they stressed that the "appellants' claims must be
81. Id. at 641 (quoting Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn v. Certain Cargo of Petroleum
(Occidental), 577 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1978)).
82. Id. at 643. The court added that that "[t]he evidence shows overwhelmingly that the Army
was an integral part of any decision to deploy and protect convoys." Id.
83. Id. The court listed examples of areas in which it believed it would have to impermissibly
substitute its judgment for that of the Army, including "determining what intelligence the Army gave
to KBR about the route, whether that intelligence was sufficient, what forces were deployed with the
convoys, whether they were sufficient, and whether they performed properly." Id.
84. Appellants' Brief at 2, Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-0874).
85. Id. at21.
86. Id.
87. Appellees' Brief at 1, Lane, 529 F.3d 548.
88. Id. at 32. KBR essentially repeated their arguments from the district court that:
[1] [T]he Constitution textually commits to the political branches consideration of the
military, national security, and foreign policy decisions and issues that adjudication of
appellants claims would entail;
[2]There are no judicially discoverable manageable standards for resolving the
military, national security, and foreign affairs decisions and issues that adjudication of
appellants claims would require; and
[3] [A]djudication of appellant's claims would require policy determinations that
exceed judicial discretion and demonstrate lack of respect for the political branches.
Id. at 32-47.
89. Id. at 36, 42.
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analyzed as they would be tried, not as they are pleaded, to determine whether
they present political questions."90
Answering these arguments, the Fifth Circuit
[A]cknowledge[d] that the [p]laintiffs' claims are set against the backdrop of
United States military action in Iraq. Thus, these cases are at the very least in
sight of an arena in which the political question doctrine has served one of its
most important and traditional functions - precluding judicial review of the
decisions made by the Executive during war time.9 1
The court noted that the days in which "the Supreme Court would categorically
remove disputes implicating the "conduct of foreign relations" from judicial
purview" 92 were long past and referenced the Baker court's admonition that "it
is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 93
Moreover, the appellate court disagreed with the lower court's application
of the Baker tests. According to the Fifth Circuit, "the first Baker [test] is
primarily concerned with direct actions taken by a coordinate branch of the
federal government." KBR, by invoking the textual commitment test, therefore
faced a "double burden." 94 Under this burden, "[f]irst, [KBR] must demonstrate
that the claims against it will require reexamination of a decision by the military.
Then it must demonstrate the military decision at issue is .. .insulated from
judicial review." 95 With little to no explanation of how KBR failed to meet that
double burden, the court then claimed that "there is no textual commitment to
the coordinate branches of the authority to adjudicate the merits of the Plaintiff's
claims against KBR for breach of its duties."9
6
The court was more sympathetic to the district court's analysis of the
90. Id. at 28. The Fifth Circuit supports the appellee's position in this regard. See Occidental
of Umm Al Qaywayn v. Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1978)) (stating
that the court considers the complaint "as it would be tried, to determine whether a political question
will emerge").
91. Lane, 529 F.3d at 558.
92. Id. (citing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
93. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
94. Id. at 560 (citing McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331, 1359 (9th Cir. 2007)).
95. Id. at 560 (quoting McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1359-60) (emphasis in original).
96. Id. The Court of Appeals claimed that it would be an "extraordinary occasion, indeed,
when the political branches delve into matters of tort-based compensation" citing the September 11
Victim Compensation Fund as one such occasion. Id. The Court made this point in support of its
claim that there is "no textual commitment to the coordinate branches of the authority to adjudicate
the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims against KBR." Yet, the U.S. Army Claims Service adjudicated the
merits of Mr. Saleh's tort claim. A military investigation concluded that Mr. Saleh was not
interrogated or abused, but should not have been at Abu Ghraib in the first place. As a result, the
Army awarded Saleh $5000 for his unnecessary internment at Abu Ghraib. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580
F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009). As a result, the executive branch's involvement in tort-based
compensation may not be that out of the ordinary, rendering the Fifth Circuit's reliance on that point
for its political question doctrine analysis misplaced.
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second Baker test, lack of judicially manageable standards.97 It claimed that
this test was "arguably the most critical factor" in Lane "because at least some
of the considerations would drag a court into a consideration of what constituted
adequate force protection for the convoys." 9 8 The court stated that the district
court may have to "adjust traditional tort standards to account for the 'less than
hospitable environment' in which KBR operated" but that in of itself is not a
justiciability issue under Baker.99
And, finally, the court made relatively short work of the district court's
determination that under the third Baker test the claims would "necessarily
entail a judicial pronouncement as to the wisdom of the military's use of civilian
contractors in a war zone."100 In the Fifth Circuit's view, the district court
would be "asked to judge KBR's policies and actions, not those of the military
or executive branch." 10 1 Indeed, the court surmised that "the application of
traditional tort standards may permit the district court to navigate through this
politically significant case without confronting a political question."
' 102
Ultimately, the court was not persuaded that the political question doctrine
applied and, thus, concluded that the judiciary could properly hear the plaintiffs'
claims. 10 3 However, in remanding the case, the court explained that it did not
"mean to indicate the district court is bound to continue its efforts to extricate
the [p]laintiff s claims from the military decision indefinitely."' 10 4
That insurgent attacks on U.S. logistics convoys in Iraq did not, at least in
Lane, result in the application of the political question doctrine may be
surprising to some. 10 5 According to the doctrine, courts should be more likely
97. Lane, 529 F.3d at 556. In a footnote to its analysis of the second Baker test, the court
stated that the plaintiffs' claims did not "directly challenge any government or Executive action" and
were "far enough removed from the type of textual commitment envisioned by Baker and its
progeny to shift [the court's] primary analysis to the second factor." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 563 (referring to McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1363-64).
100. Id. (referring to McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1364).
101. Lane v. Halliburton (Lane Appeal), 529 F.3d 548, 563 (5th Cir. 2008).
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Since the cases returned to the district court in July 2007, there have been over 200
hundred additional docket entries, although the nature of the filings is unclear as most are sealed. See
docket entries dated between July 7, 2007 and the present, Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d
637 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (No. H-05-1731). Presumably Halliburton has, or will, renew its motion to
dismiss on political question grounds, so the cases may return to the Fifth Circuit.
104. Lane Appeal, 529 F.3d at 556.
105. But see Smith v. Halliburton, No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30,
2006) (holding that the political question doctrine prevented the court from hearing a case brought
by the representatives of a KBR employee killed when a suicide bomber detonated an explosive in a
dining facility on a U.S. military base in Iraq). The court determined that the military and not KBR
was responsible for security or force protection functions: "were the case to proceed, this court
would have to second-guess the decisions of the United States military, even though the suit is
ostensibly against only military contractors." Id.
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to dismiss a case on political question grounds if they believe that the military is
in actual control of the specific contractor actions relevant to an element of the
tort suit. In practice, however, the outcome of the political question analysis
appears to depend on the decision making level the court considers when
assessing the suit. If assessing the suit at a macro decision making level, the
foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief powers of the executive branch
inherent in the decision to invade Iraq and to rely on contractors would be
relevant. At the other end of the spectrum, at the micro decision making level,
the inquiry would focus on whether the government or the contractor controlled
a logistics convoy's movement from point A to point B and under what
conditions it did so. As the following cases demonstrate, while the micro level
approach brings the specificity and detail the macro view lacks, trying to parse
out the level and type of control over a logistics convoy as a way to determine
the applicability of the political question yields outcomes no more coherent or
predictable.
2. Convoy Accidents
In Whitaker1 06 and Carmichael,10 7 Georgia district courts found that the
political question doctrine precluded them from considering the military's level
of control over convoy operations in Iraq. Yet, in neither decision did the courts
link the military's control to a cause of the accident, proximate or otherwise. It
is also not clear what specific unreviewable military decision the courts believed
were inextricably linked to the cases. Here again, the judiciary's lack of
analytical clarity on these points further complicates the application of the
doctrine.
a. Whitaker
In Whitaker, a U.S. Army Soldier was killed in Iraq in April 2004 while
escorting a KBR logistics convoy. 10 8 After a KBR vehicle drove off a bridge,
Private First Class Whitaker stopped his vehicle which was then struck by the
KBR vehicle following it, knocking Whitaker's vehicle near the edge of the
bridge.10 9 While trying to escape this precarious position, Whitaker fell off the
bridge and drowned. 110 Whitaker's parents filed suit, labeling the case a
"garden variety road wreck" for which they claimed judicially discoverable and
106. Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
107. Carmichael v. KBR (Carmichael 1), 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ala. 2006), affd,
Carmichael v. KBR (Carmichael Appeal), 572 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). While this section refers to
aspects of the Carmichael appeal, the focus is on the district court's analysis.
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manageable standards existed.111
In reply, KBR moved to dismiss on political question grounds. 112 The U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted KBR's motion, holding
that the convoy operation was "planned by the military, which determined the
placement of vehicles in the convoy, the speed of the convoy, and the distance
between vehicles in the convoy." 113 The court stated that the circumstances,
while involving no insurgent activity, were dramatically different "from driving
on an interstate highway or country road" in the United States and that "[t]he
question here is not just what a reasonable driver would do-it is what a
reasonable driver in a combat zone, subject to military regulations and orders,
would do." 114
In spite of the court's clear rejection of the claim, it never explained exactly
how the circumstances differed from a "garden variety road wreck," nor did it
discuss how PFC Whitaker being subject to military regulations and orders
related to his particular accident. Similarly, while all of Iraq may generally be
considered a combat zone, unless Whitaker or others in the convoy took
different actions on the Iraqi bridge than they would have in comparatively safe
Kuwait or even the United States, then just being in a combat zone bears little on
causation. The court's reliance on the fact that the military planned the convoy
also seems misplaced, unless the manner in which the military planned the
convoy was a significant factor in the first vehicle going off the bridge, PFC
Whitaker's decision to stop his vehicle, or the vehicle behind PFC Whitaker's
striking his.
b. Carmichael
In May 2004, Sergeant (SGT) Keith Carmichael was a military escort and
passenger in a KBR tractor-trailer in Iraq when a contractor employee lost
control of the vehicle and plummeted into a ravine.1 1 5 Carmichael suffered
severe injuries and his wife filed suit against KBR on his behalf.116 The District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia initially denied a motion to dismiss
111. Id. at 1282.
112. See Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
113. Id. at 1282.
114. Id. The district court likened the political question analysis in Whitaker to a suit filed by
Turkish sailors after missiles fired by a U.S. ship during a training exercise injured them. As in
Whitaker, the court found that there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards, that a
decision on the merits would require the court to make policy decisions "of a kind appropriately
reserved for military discretion," and that "adjudicating the case would express a lack of respect for
the political branches of the government." Id. at 1280-81 (quoting Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d
1400, 1403 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
115. Carmichael1, 450F. Supp. 2dat 1374.
116. Id.
2010]
200 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
on political question grounds, stating its disagreement with Whitaker's
reasoning. 117 Yet, after two years of discovery, the court dismissed the case on
essentially the same grounds, providing no more clarity than the court did in
Whitaker.1 8 While the plaintiffs presented evidence that "the convoy was a
non-combat operation and that each individual driver retained discretion to vary
his speed or course within the convoy to operate his vehicle safely," 119 the court
was persuaded by KBR's evidence that:
[T]he army did in fact control every aspect of the organization, planning and
execution of the convoy in question. The KBR drivers were trained according to
military standards, the military convoy commander retained responsibility for
inspecting both drivers and their equipment before commencing the convoy, and
the route and speed of the convoy were set by the military and not by the civilian
drivers. Therefore, the conduct of the military and its handling of supply convoys
used to support military operations would necessarily be questioned were this
case allowed to go forward.120
When the court originally denied KBR's motion, its inquiry focused on the
actions of the KBR employee driving the tractor-trailer Carmichael occupied.121
Specifically, the court hypothesized that "it is conceivable that at the time of the
accident [the contractor employee] was driving the truck within the speed limit
set by the military yet in a manner that was negligent in some other respect.' 122
The court did not revisit its own hypothesis when later dismissing the case
despite evidence the plaintiffs presented concerning individual driver options on
speed and course and the fact that only Carmichael's vehicle veered into a
ravine. The court itself initially claimed that "[i]f there is no showing that
resolution of a survivor's negligence claims would require the [c]ourt's
reexamination of any decision made by the U.S. military, the case presents no
political question, and therefore the [c]ourt has jurisdiction over the case."' 123 In
later dismissing the case, the court failed to state what military decision the court
would have to examine to resolve the inquiry concerning a vehicle driving off
the road.124 Though the military makes numerous decisions and the incident
happened in Iraq, unless those decisions and the situs of the incident influence
the tort elements in some way, they do not seem legally relevant and certainly
117. Id. at 1377. In its initial ruling, the court stated that it respectfully disagreed with, and
would not follow, the middle district's ruling in Whitaker. Id.
118. Carmichael v. KBR (Carmichael I/), 564 F.Supp.2d 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
119. Id. at 1368.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1376.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1367.
124. The Eleventh Circuit decision is similarly imprecise. Neither court ever links any aspect of
the road conditions to the accident, and insurgent activity was not involved. Instead, the court
discusses how those "difficult military conditions" required "delicately-calibrated decisions based on
military judgment, experience, and intelligence-gathering." Id.
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not dispositive of a justiciability issue such as the political question doctrine. 12 5
c. Potts
Indeed, in Potts, where combat circumstances in Iraq played a role in the
accident, the court found that the political question doctrine did not apply. Mr.
Potts, a contract employee who worked for Worldwide Network Services, Inc.,
filed suit1 26 against Dyncorp for injuries he suffered as a result of a car accident
while a passenger of a Dyncorp driver in Iraq. 12 7 Traveling at a high rate of
speed, the driver swerved to avoid what he thought may be an improvised
explosive device (IED). 12 8 The vehicle flipped, burst into flames, and severely
injured Potts. 12 9 After Potts filed suit, the court denied Dyncorp's attempt to
amend its answer to assert the political question doctrine, holding that "Dyncorp
mischaracterizes the issue by implying that the court would have to assess
United States military or State Department policies to determine whether
Dyncorp was negligent."' 130 The court claimed that the plaintiffs correctly
summarized the case as involving a "civilian contract to provide non-military
security services to non-military personnel for the purpose of delivering non-
military supplies."' 13 1 It was, therefore, "able to assess whether the private
contractor was negligent or wanton, even when performing services in a war
zone. The fact that the car accident at issue occurred in a war zone does not
automatically result in a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issue."']32
The court's focus in Potts on the macro level of Dyncorp's contract with
the government dictated the outcome of the political question analysis. That
focus came at the expense of considering the specific cause of the accident, an
attempt to avoid what was feared to be an IED. Where there is a nexus between
125. The plaintiff-appellants unsuccessfully made a similar argument to the Eleventh Circuit in
Carmichael. They alleged that Mr. Irvin's was the only vehicle in a 15 vehicle convoy that crashed,
suggesting negligence by Irvin and not a treacherous roadway. Carmichael Appeal, 572 F.3d 1271,
1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 2009). The court labeled this argument "much too facile." Id. The plaintiff-
appellants also argued that Mr. Irvin was "responsible for steering the vehicle and controlling its
speed" which the court deemed "little more than a play on the words 'control' and 'responsibility."'
Id. at 1284.
126. Potts v. DynCorp Int'l, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
127. See id. Dyncorp operated in Iraq pursuant to a contract with the U.S. government for an
"oil for food" project. Id. at 1248.
128. For general information on IEDs, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Pub. No.
RS22330, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: EFFECTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES (2006).
129. Potts, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
130. Id. at 1250.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1253.
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the proximate cause of a tort action and a uniquely combat operation
circumstance like IEDs, the potential for the political question doctrine to apply
should exist, but, as discussed above, the court in Potts thought otherwise.
Without suggesting that the court ignore Dyncorp's contract with the
government, justice may have been better served by focusing on how and from
whom Dyncorp drivers learned of IED threats and received training on how to
respond. Such evidence, or lack thereof, would be more directly relevant and
more helpful to the trier of fact. For example, evidence that the military did, or
did not, brief Dyncorp drivers about the IED threat or provided counter IED
driving training would influence whether the military would be implicated in the
judicial determination as to whether the driver's response and reaction to what
he thought was an IED were reasonable. As it stands, it remains unclear just
how the court will develop judicial standards to evaluate the threat of IEDs,
determine whether the driver's belief that the object in the road was an IED, and
evaluate if his subsequent reactions were reasonable.
3. The Real Inquiry
Not all courts have shared these struggles in applying the political question
doctrine to wartime contractor tort litigation that have been presented above. In
Lessin133 and McMahon,134 both a district and an appellate court provide useful
examples of how to resolve political question disputes involving government
contractors with greater analytical rigor and clarity.
The Lessin case concerns a U.S. Army soldier injured while providing a
military escort to a KBR logistics convoy in Iraq.135 While en route from Iraq
to Kuwait, one of KBR's trucks stopped due to a malfunctioning loading
ramp. 136 When Lessin attempted to help the driver of the truck, the ramp struck
him in the head, severely injuring him as a result.137 Lessin filed suit against
KBR, which moved to dismiss the complaint based on the political question
doctrine.
138
133. Lessin v. KBR, No. H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006).
134. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2007). Interestingly, the court
that decided McMahon is the same court that later decided Carmichael, the Eleventh Circuit.
Nonetheless, the two cases are difficult to reconcile. Both involve crashes, in McMahon of an
airplane in Afghanistan and in Carmichael a vehicle in Iraq, which seem to lack a nexus to combat
operations. In McMahon, the Eleventh Circuit held that the political question doctrine did not apply,
but in Carmichael it found that it did. One distinction that may have informed the court's decision
was the record before the court when it heard the cases. McMahon reached the court of appeals with
minimal information while Carmichael arrived after several years of discovery.
135. Lessin, 2006 WL 3940556, at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *2. KBR argued that the case involved the first four Baker tests. Id. at *3. Under the
first Baker test, KBR asserted that Lessin's claims "necessarily involve issues committed to the
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The court disagreed, holding that KBR failed to demonstrate that "military
decision-making or policy would be a necessary inquiry, inseparable from the
claims asserted." 139  Instead, the court determined that Lessin's claims of
KBR's negligence were "not certain to implicate such topics, or any others that
are committed to the political branches. The incident at issue in this case was,
essentially, a traffic accident, involving a commercial truck alleged to have been
negligently maintained, as well as a civilian truck driver who was allegedly
negligent in operating the truck and insufficiently trained." 140
In similar fashion, the Eleventh Circuit in McMahon distinguished the
defendant's assertion of the political question doctrine's applicability from the
plaintiffs' claims and the evidence required to prove those claims. 14 1 On
November 27, 2004, a contractor owned and operated airplane crashed into the
side of a mountain in Afghanistan killing all aboard, including three active duty
members of the U.S. Army.14 2 Relatives of the soldiers filed a wrongful death
suit against the contractor, Presidential Airways. 143 In turn, Presidential
Airways filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on the political question
doctrine arguing that "were this lawsuit to proceed, [the district court] would
inevitably be asked to resolve a number of military 'policy choices and value
determinations,"' such as why the DoD specified, among other things, the
aircraft type, the aircraft equipment, and the pilot qualifications and approved
executive branch, including military decision-making and the conduct of military operations." Id.
KBR argued that "because Lessin was injured while attempting to assist the malfunctioning convoy
truck, adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims will require an inquiry into whether Lessin was trained properly
on civilian equipment, whether he complied with applicable military regulations and directives
regarding civilian contractor convoys, and whether these military regulations were adequate to
prevent his injury." Id. KBR attempted to bolster its argument that the Plaintiffs' allegations would
involve military decision making by claiming that following an investigation of Lessin's injury, the
military purportedly developed new procedures limiting military personnel from assisting civilian
convoys. Id. For the second Baker test, KBR contended that Lessin's claims were not susceptible to
resolution by judicially discoverable standards. Id. at 3-4. KBR's argument of how the second Baker
test applied was that the court was unable to develop standards to access the reasonableness of the
military's judgment in "permitting the civilian truck at issue to be a part of the military convoy.., for
the military to stop the convoy in a combat zone to attempt to repair the truck, whether it was
appropriate for Lessin to assist in the truck's repair, and whether the military exercised an
appropriate level of maintenance over the truck." Id. KBR concluded its political question argument
by arguing that the third and fourth Baker tests were also implicated as the case, in KBR's view,
would "require the Court to undertake an initial policy decision concerning the interaction between
military personnel and civilian contractors in a combat zone, and to express a lack of respect due to
the coordinate branches of government that oversee such war efforts." Id. at 4.
139. Id. The court acknowledged that where the military's strategy, decision-making, or orders
are necessarily bound up with the claims asserted in a case, the political question doctrine is
implicated, and the case is inappropriate for judicial inquiry. Id.
140. Id. at4-5.
141. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. Id. at 1336.
143. Id.
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the route structures of the acknowledged DoD mission. . ."144 Presidential
claimed that these are "military choices and value determinations that are
'constitutionally committed for resolution to the legislative or executive
branches."' 14 5
The district court denied the motion and Presidential filed an interlocutory
appeal with the Eleventh Circuit. 146 At this point, the only evidence before both
courts was the complaint, the contract between Presidential and DoD to provide
air transport, and the statement of work for that contract. 14 7 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, ruling that Presidential did not
even satisfy the threshold requirement of the first Baker factor - a demonstration
that the case would "require examination of any decision made by the
military."'14 8 While the court acknowledged that "[t]he military chose the start
and the end points of the flights, and when the flights would be flown... [i]t was
not evident" the court continued "that [the plaintiffs'] allegations relate to any of
these discrete areas of military responsibility." 149
Presidential, the Eleventh Circuit held, "also failed to show that the case
will require the application of judicially unmanageable standards."'1 50 The court
conceded that "flying over Afghanistan during wartime is different from flying
over Kansas on a sunny day," but added "that does not render the suit non
justiciable."' 15 1 In the court's view, "[a]s in any tort suit involving a plane crash,
144. Motion to Dismiss at 19, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, No. 05-1002, (M.D. Fla. Dec.
15, 2005). While the Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by Presidential Airways' argument in
McMahon, the court accepted what seems a similar argument in Carmichael when dealing with the
military's role in convoy operations. See Carmichael Appeal, 572 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2009).
145. Motion to Dismiss at 19, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, No. 05-1002 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
15, 2005).
146. McMahon v. Presidential Airways at 1336.
147. Id. at 1360. On appeal, Presidential unsuccessfully argued that in addition to the
complaint, contract and statement of work, the court should also consider declarations from
Presidential employees that "tended to demonstrate that the military made certain decisions with
respect to the operation of the flight on the day in question." Id. As discussed in footnote 134, supra,
the limited amount of information before the court in McMahon may be how to reconcile its ruling
which followed with the subsequent Carmichael decision.
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 1361.
150. Id. at 1363.
151. Id. at 1364. The court seemed to change its characterization of the relevance of
Afghanistan to the crash in McMahon. In Carmichael, the Eleventh Circuit referred to the flight in
McMahon as "more or less a routine airplane flight" and that the fact that the crash took place over
Afghanistan during wartime "was incidental." Carmichael Appeal, 572 F.3d 1271, 1290-91 (9th Cir.
2009). In Carmichael, the court attempted to distinguish McMahon on the grounds that military
activities in Afghanistan were not related to the accident, while the convoy operation to deliver fuel
in Carmichael was "utterly central" to the military. Id. at 1291. While delivering fuel is undoubtedly
important, the aircraft in McMahon was transporting three service members, including a Lieutenant
Colonel and a Chief Warrant Officer, in Afghanistan. McMahon 1, 502 F.3d at 1336. Movement of
military members on the battlefield would seem to be either "utterly central" to, if not a military
[Vol. 28:1
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the court will simply have to determine whether the choices made were
negligent." 152
Other courts have not had the same success as Lessin and McMahon in
identifying the proper decision making level at which to evaluate whether a suit
implicates the political question doctrine. Adjudicating the political question
doctrine in wartime contractor litigation is daunting-courts must apply a
loosely defined doctrine to situations arising from two complex U.S. led wars in
which contractors play a much greater role in proportional numbers and
functional diversity than ever before. Further complicating matters, litigants
each pursue their own agendas with plaintiffs couching complaints as little more
than the "red car/blue car" traffic accident of law school torts, and defendants
claiming that judges who would hear cases like these overstep constitutional
bounds and intrude on the executive branch. Changes in how the government
views and employs contractors, and its conspicuous absence from the litigation
in which contractors have asserted the political question doctrine, make the
challenge courts face greater still.
IV.
THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN CREATING CONFUSION (OR AT LEAST NOT
HELPING TO CLARIFY)
A. Changes in How the Government Views Contractors
According to the Congressional Research Service, "[n]ot since the 17th
century has there been such a reliance on private military actors to accomplish
tasks directly affecting the success of military engagements. Private contractors
are now so firmly embedded in intervention, peacekeeping, and occupation that
this trend has arguably reached the point of no return."' 153 Others refer to
contractors as a "fourth branch of government"'154 and "quasi agencies" of the
activity outright.
152. McMahon 1, 502 F.3d at 1364 (9th Cir. 2007). Yet, as noted earlier, the court was
unwilling to follow that approach in Carmichael.
153. CRS, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Fred Schreier & Marina Caparini, Privatizing Security:
Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies, Geneva Center for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 1 (March 2005)). See Zamparelli, supra note 3, at 9 (stating
that "[n]ever has there been such a reliance on nonmilitary members to accomplish tasks directly
affecting the tactical successes of an engagement."). See generally, P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003) (detailing the evolution of
the military service industry and privatization of warfare).
154. Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, U.S. Contractors Becoming a Fourth Branch of Government,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2007/02/04/america/web.0204contract.php. Shane and Nixon contend that the government's
"reflexive answer to almost every problem" is to "hire another contractor" and that "the most
successful contractors are not necessarily those doing the best work, but those who have mastered
the special skill of selling to Uncle Sam." Id.
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federal government.1
55
The Joint Chiefs of Staff attribute DoD's increased reliance on contractors
to a host of factors, including:
reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and
combat service support areas), increases in operations tempo and missions
undertaken by the military, increased complexity and sophistication of weapon
systems, and a continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through the
outsourcing or privatizing of commercially adaptable functions. 15
6
This increased reliance has rendered contractor support to the DoD a "core
logistic capability" which provides a military commander the "ability to
synchronize and integrate both the delivery of service, agency, and other
government organization contract support."' 157 Despite this recognition of
contractor importance, according to a descriptively titled GAO report, DoD
plans do not adequately address contractors.158 The GAO found that while DoD
relies on contractors "to supply a wide variety of services," DoD and the
military services "could not quantify the totality of support that contractors
provide to deployed forces around the world."' 1
59
The government's relationship with contractors appears erratic. It values
and increasingly relies on contractors, 160 including them and their functions in
military doctrine manuals, yet it does not adequately plan for contractors and
does not track when contractors are wounded or killed. 161 In some instances,
the government does not even know how many contractors it employs.
162
Further complicating questions of tort liability and the applicability of the
political question doctrine, the government has changed how it views
contracts. 163 Moreover, it remains conspicuously absent from litigation over tort
155. Singer, supra note 153. According to Singer, "[w]e've created huge behemoths that are
doing 90 or 95 percent of their business with the government... .[t]hey're not really companies,
they're quasi agencies." Id. at 6. Yet Singer refers to the use of Brown and Root to provide logistics
for U.S. military forces deployed in and around Kosovo instead of calling up 9,000 reservists as "one
of the quiet triumphs of the war in Kosovo." Id.
156. JOINT PuB. 4-0, supra note 4.
157. Id.
158. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-03-695, MILITARY OPERATIONS: CONTRACTORS
PROVIDE VITAL SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD
PLANS 1 (2003).
159. Id.
160. But see Cam Simpson & Christopher Conkey, Obama Aims to Reduce Reliance on
Contractors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB123578119096998007.html (reporting that through a budget blueprint President Obama
seeks to roll back "Washington's dependence on private sector contractors" but also noting that "the
lack of specifics [in the blueprint] suggests the difficulty of the task").
161. GAO, supra note 1, at 27-28, 33, and 38. See Schooner, supra note 5.
162. GAO contractor tracking, supra note 5.
163. As discussed earlier, the government employs contractors to perform the inherently
governmental function of interrogation and several lawsuits against contract interrogators are
[Vol, 28:1
SQUARE PEG INA ROUND HOLE
claims arising from contract performance, which only obfuscates its relationship
with contractors and the resulting judicial inquiry into their potential liability.
B. Changes to How the Government Views Contracts
Largely absent from cases thus far is any discussion of the U.S.
government's shift to performance-based acquisition, which changed how the
executive branch views and structures the contracts underlying the litigation.
164
Performance-based acquisition is "a technique for structuring all aspects of an
acquisition around the purpose and outcome desired as opposed to the process
by which the work is to be performed." 165 The concept is not new, having been
around since the 1990s. 16 6 The 2001 NDAA established a preference for
performance-based contracts. 167 The preference is now a requirement under the
Federal Acquisition Regulations 168 and a separate approval process is required
if an acquisition for services is not performance-based. 1
69
Performance-based acquisition would seem to aid at least the framework by
which some of the plaintiffs attempt to argue their case, while undermining the
contractor defendants' arguments. In an acquisition for logistics services, which
form the basis for the convoy related litigation previously discussed, the
government's focus is now required to be on purpose and outcome, and not, as
contractors argue, on dictating or controlling specific details of logistic convoy
operations.
ongoing. See supra Part M.A.
164. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did discuss performance based contracting
in Saleh, but not in the context of the political question doctrine. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
165. The term performance based acquisition replaced the term performance based contracting.




167. THE FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 821 (2001).
168. See 48 C.F.R. § 37.000 (2009) (requiring "the use of performance-based acquisitions for
services to the maximum extent practicable and prescribing policies and procedures for use of
performance-based acquisition methods").
169. See 48 C.F.R.§ 7.105(b)(4) (requiring that a written acquisition plan "[p]rovide rationale if
a performance based acquisition will not be used or if a performance-based acquisition for services
is contemplated on other than a firm fixed- price basis"); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. § 237.170-2 (2009) (describing the required approval process to
acquire services through a non performance-based contract); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMy, ARMY FEDERAL
ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. pt. 5137.590-1 (2007) (stating that the Army acquisition team will "focus
on the importance of developing and maintaining sound acquisition strategies to ensure services are
properly planned, based upon clear, performance-based requirements and acquired by sound
business practices").
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C. Conspicuous Silence
Despite the important role contractors play in today's military, in the host
of contractor related litigation where the government is not a party and the
political question doctrine has been raised, there is not a single reported case of
the government intervening or submitting an amicus curiae brief to the court.
The closest the government seems to have come was in Lane, discussed
above. 170 During the pendency of the appeal in Lane, the Department of Justice
(DoJ) filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file an amicus curiae
brief.17 1 Having received the requested extension, the following month the DoJ
filed a letter with the Fifth Circuit "advising that an amicus brief will not be
filed." 172
The fact that the United States is not a party to the litigation does not, in
itself, preclude the application of the political question doctrine by the court. 173
But what, if anything, may a court permissibly infer from the government's lack
of involvement in a case in which a defense contractor is asserting the political
question doctrine as a defense? Answering that question requires consideration
of the political question doctrine beyond battlefield contractor litigation. Courts
have also given mixed signals in this broader category of cases. For example,
the Ninth Circuit held that silence by the government is a neutral factor1 74 while
the Third and Eleventh Circuits have held that courts may make inferences
based on the government's silence in cases involving the political question
doctrine.
17 5
The Ninth Circuit, in Alperin v. Vatican Bank, considered a suit against the
Vatican Bank stemming from World War II claims issue. 17 6 The court noted
170. Lane v. Halliburton, No. 06-1971, 2006 WL 2796249 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006).
171. See docket entry dated May 24, 2007, Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008)
(requesting extension to file an amicus brief). The published opinion lists the United States as
amicus curiae.
172. See id. (approving extension); docket entry dated June 12, 2007, Lane v. Halliburton, 529
F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (reflecting notice by the government that it would not be submitting a
brief).
173. See U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (stating that the identity of the parties
is immaterial to the presence of the political question doctrine in a particular case).
174. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556 (9th Cir. 2005). See Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation, 340 F. Supp 2d 494, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that "the
Government's decision to intervene, or not, in a particular case relating to foreign affairs, and what
form its intervention should take were it to do so, is informed by a variety of intricate diplomatic and
political consideration that make this sort of inferential reasoning by a courts a perilous enterprise").
175. See Gross v. German Foundation Industrial Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2006);
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2007). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit discussed that the government had not chosen to intervene in Saleh or file an amicus
brief, but not as related to the political question doctrine. Salch v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
176. Alperin, 410 F.3d at 556.
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that "[a]lthough the political question doctrine often lurks in the shadow of
cases," the doctrine is "infrequently addressed head on."'177 Nonetheless, the
court found that the political question barred part of the suit. 17 8 Much like its
practice in the contractor litigation, the United States did not intervene or infonn
the court of the government's view as to whether the political question doctrine
should apply in Alperin. The court addressed this lack of involvement in stating
that "[i]t is unclear, however, how courts should construe executive silence. We
are not mind readers. And, thus, we cannot discern whether the State
Department's decision not to intervene is an implicit endorsement, an objection,
or simple indifference. At best this silence is a neutral factor."
1 7 9
In the Third Circuit, Gross v. German Foundation Industrial Initiative
involved a foundation seeking additional funds to pay victims of Nazi era
wrongs.180  The United States was not a party to the litigation, and its
correspondence to the court stated that it did not have a position as to the
justiciability of the case. 18 1 The Third Circuit also noted that the United States
could have intervened in the case or petitioned the court to participate as amicus
curiae, but did not. 182 In the end, the court determined that the political question
doctrine did not apply, at least in part, "[b]ecause the United States Executive
has declined to take a take a formal position on the justiciability of this case.
,,183
The McMahon case is even more instructive on this point, as it involved
allegations of wartime contractor liability and the court was even more direct in
its assessment of the government's silence. 184 In upholding the district court's
denial of Presidential Airways' motion to dismiss on political question grounds,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[w]e note that to this point, the United States
has not intervened in the instant case, despite an invitation to do so . . . The
apparent lack of interest from the United States to this point fortifies our
conclusion that the case does not yet present a political question."
' 185
The absence of U.S. involvement in cases involving the political question
doctrine is even more striking when compared with U.S. involvement with
177. Id. at 538.
178. Id. at 537.
179. Id. at 556.
180. Gross, 456 F.3d at 363.
181. Id. at 384-95.
182. Id. at 385.
183. Id. at 363. The Third Circuit reversed the trial court decision that the political question
doctrine applied.
184. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (9th Cir. 2007).
185. Id. This suggests that the Eleventh Circuit's view on drawing inferences requires not just
government silence, but silence following an express judicial invitation to comment.
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another doctrine which also involves justiciability, the act of state doctrine. 186
In these cases, the government developed "the Bernstein Letter" whereby the
DoS informs the court if the executive branch believes that the act of state
doctrine applies to pending litigation.187
So why hasn't the government made its views known in significant
battlefield-related tort litigation wherein contractors have asserted the political
question doctrine in an attempt to preclude a court from hearing the case? One
likely possibility is that by expressing its view on the applicability of the
political question doctrine in a given case the executive branch would favor one
side of the litigation over the other. This is an outcome which, particularly when
U.S. service members are suing contractors, the government may wish to
avoid. 188 For other plaintiff categories, the government likely does not want to
involve itself in litigation between private contractors. Likewise, it would be
problematic for the executive branch to submit a position to the court on the
applicability of the doctrine to suits by persons it was responsible for detaining
at Abu Ghraib. Moreover, if the executive branch's position were that the
doctrine does not apply, then it would increase the chances of successful
litigation success against companies with which it has billions of dollars of
contracts and upon which its continued operation depends. On the other hand, if
the executive branch's position is that the doctrine does apply, the case against
the contractor might be dismissed, but, at least as regards the Abu Ghraib
plaintiffs, it might also result in the executive branch having to explain to at
least two treaty bodies whether the required remedy exists for former detainees
who allege torture. 189
In not submitting a position to the courts on contractor litigation involving
the political question doctrine, the government may avoid initial offense to one
party but almost ensures offense to both in the end. Also, somewhat
counterintuitively, by remaining silent on the applicability of the political
question doctrine, the government likely creates more work for itself, not
less. 190 Without the government's input, courts inefficiently grapple with the
186. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION THIRD
EDITION 529 (2006) (referring to Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatshcappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 14(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113; S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988); 23
I.L.M. 1027 (1984) (requiring "that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation"); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20,6
I.L.M. 368 (1967) (requiring "that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity").
190. There is also the possibility that by not submitting a statement to the court in cases in
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competing characterizations of how the executive branch is or is not implicated
by the questions the case presents. Furthermore, regardless of which way the
court rules on the political question doctrine, either or both sides will likely
attempt to engage the government by seeking declarations and trying to
subpoena testimony and documents from it. In this way, the government will
likely become involved, even when it does not submit its views to the court,
jeopardizing both the efficiency of the process and control over its involvement.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the lack of government involvement has
played a role in the inconsistent application of the political question doctrine to
wartime contractor litigation and that this, in turn, increases the chances that the
Supreme Court will hear an appeal and provide guidance on the doctrine-an
outcome the government may also want to avoid. If avoiding Supreme Court
intervention is the government's goal, then not appearing in any of the cases and
remaining silent on executive's view would not seem to further that goal.
Indeed, the chance that the political question doctrine may return to the Supreme
Court through a government contractor battlefield related tort case seems
increasingly likely. 191
V.
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION, RESULTING CONFUSION, AND THE WAY AHEAD
The situation in Iraq has improved in the past year. Iraq now assumes
responsibility for detainees and convoys are rarely attacked. 192 This might lead
which the political question doctrine should apply, the government may end up reimbursing the
contractor defendants for their litigation costs under some contract structures. In suits by service
members, this would be an odd result as service members are generally precluded from suing the
government in tort. There seems little functional difference between a service member suing the
government directly as opposed to suing and recovering from a contractor, who in turn is reimbursed
by the government. See FAR § 52.228-7(c), which provides for a contractor to be reimbursed for
"liabilities" arising out of the performance of the contractor, including for death and bodily injury.
But see Risk/Liability to Third Parties/Indemnification, 73 FED. REG. 62 (Mar. 31, 2008) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 252.225-7040(b)(2) (referencing contractor concern for the availability of
indemnification and stating that contractors are accountable for the negligent or willful actions of
their employees, including subcontractors. In the Federal Register, the government reiterates the
view that under performance based contracting, the government "does not, in fact, exercise specific
control over the actions and decisions of the contractor").
191. As of this Article, the Fifth Circuit in Fisher found the doctrine did not apply to a convoy
attacked by insurgents while the Eleventh Circuit in Carmichael found that the doctrine did apply in
a vehicle crash. In similar fashion, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed the Saleh
interrogator cases (although not expressly on political question doctrine grounds) while a district
court within the Fourth Circuit has ruled that the doctrine does not preclude the Al-Shimari
interrogator cases.
192. However, as the situation in Iraq has improved it has deteriorated in Afghanistan. As the
United States shifts its attention and the focus of its total military force to Afghanistan, it will be
interesting to see if there is a corresponding spike in lawsuits filed against contractors. This raises
the question of how much the intensity (or lack thereof) of combat operations weighs in the judicial
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one to question whether the cases arising from the treatment of detainees or the
conduct of convoys in Iraq have any enduring significance, if the underlying
incidents which generated the litigation are not likely to be repeated. However,
interrogating detainees and driving logistics convoys are just two manifestations
of a broader phenomena-the United States military's extensive reliance on
private contractors and the occurrence of tort incidents that inevitably result,
whether between contractors and local nationals, U.S. service members, or other
contractors. 
19 3
As courts attempt to distinguish contractor tort cases involving the political
question doctrine from each other, the resulting jurisprudence promises
problems for both present and future litigants. One theory explaining this is that
the current difficulty flows from Baker v. Carr, the lead case establishing the
tests for applying the political question doctrine. 194 The Baker tests have proven
an unsteady foundation for political question doctrine jurisprudence. Courts
have wrestled with the Supreme Court's requirement to avoid "semantic
cataloguing"' 19 5 yet "analyze representative cases and to infer from them the
analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine." 196 The current
political question doctrine decisions in battlefield contractor litigation are the
analytical threads upon which future decisions may unfortunately attempt to
rely. Some might argue that, even if the Baker tests were useful when
announced, the real cause of the current difficulty is the unique collision of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the burgeoning use of contractors in roles
traditionally reserved for the government; a collision which neither the political
question doctrine nor the judiciary appear well-equipped to handle.
Issues of justiciability are a contradiction of sorts, as courts must consider
detailed aspects of a case just to determine whether the court may permissibly
calculus. In any case, it seems clear that type of litigation treated here is not likely to disappear any
time soon.
193. In demonstration of the inevitability of future litigation and perhaps the start of the next
wave of contractor litigation involving the political question doctrine, see Complaint, Harris v. KBR,
No. 08-0563 (W.D. Penn. Apr. 22, 2008), a suit filed by the parents of Staff Sergeant (SSG) Ryan
Maseth, a U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier, or "Green Beret," electrocuted in Iraq while in the
shower of a building allegedly maintained by KBR. At least 18 U.S. service members have been
electrocuted in Iraq, the total number of injured and killed in Iraq and Afghanistan is likely higher.
See Scott Bronstein & Abbie Boudreau, Sources: Contractor for military committed serious
violations, CNN.com, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/l1/24/soldiers.electrocuted/
index.html. See also Kimberly Hefling, State Dep 't contractor electrocuted, Associated Press, Sep.
8. 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5htvFRJgKa3
fGet485w0NBHle3KeQD9AJGRO00. (detailing the September 2009 electrocution of a DoS
contractor in Baghdad, Iraq).
194. Professor Chemerinksy has labeled the Baker v. Carr criteria "useless" and impossible to
apply to determine which cases present political questions. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 143-
145.
195. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
196. Id. at 211.
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consider the case. 197 Even so, similar cases should yield similar, not widely
disparate, outcomes. The fundamental questions remain: when should the
political question doctrine apply to wartime contractor tort litigation? How does
one balance the fact that incidents occur as a direct result of or in the shadow of
combat operations with the recognition that "[t]he Constitution's allocation of
war powers to the President and Congress does not exclude the courts from
every dispute that can arguably be connected to 'combat?"' 1 98
It would be wise for the-government to acknowledge the inevitability of
litigation resulting from the sheer number of contractors it currently employs
and the functions they perform. More importantly, the government should
recognize that by not involving itself in the litigation, it creates more work and
expense for the judiciary and sacrifices the opportunity to influence the litigation
and, thereby, prevent not only inconsistent case results but their unintended and
unforeseen consequences over time.
For their part, courts should recognize that the terms combat and wartime
are little more than labels that add little to the legal analysis in and of
themselves. 199 Several of the "wartime" convoy accidents do not involve any
relevant wartime condition-vehicles run into each other or off the road the
world over. Similarly, analysis which focuses exclusively on operational control
would seem to logically lead to the application of the political question doctrine
to convoy accidents not only in Iraq but also in non-war zones, including
domestic operations on U.S. soil. This extrapolation not only demonstrates that
the operational control test can be a red herring, but also that applying the test
without linking that control to decisions and causes relevant to the incident is
unproductive and often results in confusing and inconsistent outcomes. Finally,
courts should also take cognizance of the analytical pitfalls associated with both
the macro and micro level approach to assessing the facts of these contractor
liability cases.
If the application of the political question doctrine to wartime contractor
tort liability is so unwieldy, is there an alternative? One commentator has
suggested revising and possibly expanding the Defense Base Act (DBA).200 The
DBA provides workers' compensation protection to civilian employees working
outside the United States on U.S. military bases or under a contract with the U.S.
197. That the U.S. requires only notice pleading makes justicability determinations that much
harder.
198. Ibrahim 1, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526-35 (2004)).
199. Such terms leave doubt as to when, where, and for how long a state of "wartime" exists.
Assigning a "wartime" label leads to these inquiries which are of little utility absent some nexus
between the wartime condition and the incident.
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1654 (2006). For a discussion on the Act's revision and expansion, see
Jeremy Joseph, Striking the Balance: Domestic Tort Liability for Private Security Contractors, 5
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 691, 718 (2007) (recommending that the Defense Base Act should be the
sole remedy for private security companies' negligence towards their employees).
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government for public works or for national defense.20 1 However, even with this
approach, significant changes would be required for the DBA to address the
categories of plaintiffs and causes of action, including intentional tort claims,
addressed in this Article.20 2 Additionally, the NDAA may limit future problems
as it restricts security contractors from performing inherently governmental
functions in an area of combat operations.
This author suggests an alternative methodological approach to these cases
wherein the court would seek to determine: (1) whether the suit arises from
actions taken by a contractor in war zone, defined as geographic locations where
U.S. service members are eligible for "imminent danger pay"; (2) whether the
U.S. military controlled the actions taken by the contractor either directly or
through contract requirements; and (3) how the military operational control,
decision making, or actions are relevant to, or a cause of, the incident at issue.
The first prong of the analysis is a threshold inquiry designed to focus the
inquiry on what "wartime" condition makes a fact in issue for the litigation more
or less likely. The second prong moves past abstract Constitutional arguments
to the specifics of whether there is governmental conduct relevant to the
litigation. The final prong is designed to identify where on the causation
spectrum that conduct or control lies and whether the political question doctrine
should apply. Where the court determines the government's role to be an
attenuated cause or no cause at all, the doctrine would not apply. However, as
characterization of the government's role moves along the spectrum toward
direct cause, or in the easiest application of the methodology, the proximate
cause, the doctrine would apply.
The benefit of this proposed methodology is that it would provide courts a
tether to a more finite analytical framework while amidst the amorphous Baker
v. Carr tests. Courts applying such a framework would glean true analytical
threads, relevant to the disposition of the case at bar and helpful to instilling a
modicum of predictability in how the judiciary approaches whether the political
question doctrine applies to a wartime related contractor tort suit. This, in turn,
would lead to more consistent outcomes, which better inform prospective
litigants as to the viability of their claim or defense. In the end, the likely
outcome of these developments being fewer suits filed and quicker out of court
resolution of those which are.
201. Department of Labor Office of Workers Compensation Programs, available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/owcp/dlhwc/sdba.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
202. See Lane Appeal, supra note 101, at 556. (outlining KBR's arguments that both the DBA
and the political question doctrine bar Plaintiff's suit). In the case of KBR's DBA argument, neither
the district or Fifth Circuit courts addressed this question in their decisions. Appellant Reply Brief at
2, Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d. 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-20874) (arguing that the DBA
provides contractors a defense to contract based theories of liability, but not those based in torts).
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VI.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is not to argue for or against the applicability of
the political question doctrine, in general or in any particular case. Instead, it
seeks to shed light on the inherent difficulties courts face in applying a
confusing justiciability doctrine, the political question doctrine, to wartime
contractor tort litigation and to draw attention to difficulties enhanced by the
government's diverse use of contractors and lack of involvement in the litigation
which follows. This Article seeks to identify and separate those judicial
approaches and methods of analysis which cloud the issue from those which
clarify. In so doing, the Article proposes a new framework for considering these
cases which, although not exhaustively discussed, the author believes provides a
starting point for drawing out the elusive analytical threads that might prove be
helpful in future cases.
